Federico LuzziCambridge University Press, 8/1/2019EAN 9781108491914, ISBN10: 110849191XHardcover, 210 pages, 23.5 x 16.3 x 1.6 cmLanguage: EnglishAccording to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible - that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology.1. Knowledge from knowledge1.1 The default view1.2 Knowledge counter-closure1.3 A schema for KCC failures2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood2.1 Introduction2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy2.7. Schnee on KFF2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood2.9 Conclusion3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth3.1. Introduction3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge3.3. Agoraphobia3.4 The breadth of the challenge3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism3.6 Birthday3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism3.8 Coral3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?3.10 Conclusion4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure4.1 Introduction4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?4.3 Replacing KCC4.4 Murphy on justification and belief4.5 Denying KCCcosts?4.6 Multi-premise inference4.7 Conclusion5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge5.1 Introduction5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge5.3 Testimony and inferencea defeater asymmetry5.4 Second-hand knowledge5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge5.6 Conclusion6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge6.1 Introduction6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS6.3 Señor's objections6.4 Factual-defeater-based case7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory7.1 Inference, testimony and memory7.2 Conclusion.
Related
Related
Related
Related