Cambridge University Press, 12/20/2007EAN 9780521872829, ISBN10: 0521872820Hardcover, 778 pages, 25.9 x 18.5 x 4.6 cmLanguage: EnglishIn recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos and Vijay V. VaziraniPart I. Computing in Games1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou3. Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel4. Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour5. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns6. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin7. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani8. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi VaradarajanPart II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan10. Mechanism design without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian16. On-line mechanisms David C. ParkesPart III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games Éva Tardos and Tom Wexler20. Selfish load-balancing Berthold Vöcking21. Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms Ramesh JohariPart IV. Additional Topics22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff24. Cascading behavior in networksalgorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra29. Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory Michael Kearns and Siddharth Suri.'... a tome to be dipped into by researchers and developers who would want to know more about certain aspects of the field and particular 'state-of-the-art' issues and applications.' Kybernetes