Algorithmic Game Theory This book, first published in 2007, covers algorithmic game theory, with contributions from all the leading researchers. Noam Nisan (Edited by), Tim Roughgarden (Edited by), Eva Tardos (Edited by), Vijay V. Vazirani (Edited by) 9780521872829, Cambridge University Press Hardback, published 24 September 2007 778 pages, 36 b/w illus.25.9 x 18.5 x 4.6 cm, 1.59 kg '… a tome to be dipped into by researchers and developers who would want to know more about certain aspects of the field and particular 'state-of-the-art' issues and applications.' Kybernetes In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application. Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani Part I. Computing in Games: 1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani 2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou 3. Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel 4. Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour 5. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns 6. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin 7. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani 8. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan Part II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design: 9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan 10. Mechanism design without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra 11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen 12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi 13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin 14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker 15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian 16. On-line mechanisms David C. Parkes Part III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria: 17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos 18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden 19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games Éva Tardos and Tom Wexler 20. Selfish load-balancing Berthold Vöcking 21. Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms Ramesh Johari Part IV. Additional Topics: 22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant 23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff 24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg 25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment 26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami 27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami 28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra 29. Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory Michael Kearns and Siddharth Suri. Subject Areas: Algorithms & data structures [UMB], Game theory [PBUD], Economics [KC]
